A simple "mathematical" treatment of the equality and inequality of persons and cultures

If different groups of people have different cultures or subcultures, the "democratic" assumption that they must all be treated as having equal value is simply nonsense. And the only effects of maintaining that assumption would be conservative: to keep things as they are. That people are equal cannot mean that what they do or say is of equal value; it can only mean that what they can do is of potentially equal value, and that only because what they can do is theoretically anything, based on the assumption that as a potentiality what one "is" is a starting or zero point. This is never actually true of persons, except when considered in terms of what they can do that is potential and not actual, what they can do or be that they are not at present. The equality of persons also applies to societies or cultures, but only in potentiality and not actuality; their differences have equal "right" to be considered in a "vote."

That people are equal qua potentiality is related to the fact that they are worthy of being loved or appreciated unconditionally, as if by a divine mother. That is true of us as potentiality, but only as such. As actuality, in terms of what people actually are doing, saying, etc., there is no equality, only inequality, because differences are valued, and could only be considered equal if they were same, and could only be same qua nothing, the nothing of pure potentiality. As actuality, people have not the absolute worth of deserving unlimited respect, which they do qua potentiality, which makes them worthy of unconditional love or affirmation. Rather, as actual, people are entitled to the conditional appreciation that they would have if evaluated by a ruling divine father. This is bad news for presumed absolute equality of what people are or appear as, say, and do. But this allows for truths, as well as evaluation. It is still good news for the equality of persons qua potentiality. In this respect, children are more equal than adults. We could still treat everyone as having equal value in terms of what they say (which would be equally entitled to be considered "true") and do (equally entitled to be considered just or right) if and only if we accede to a nihilism in which we affirm that nothing has value, except to the persons affirming it, but not at all in itself, since the condition of absolute subjective relativism is objective nihilism. All this means that people may have equality in the sense of equal opportunity, but the demand that many people make for equal respect for who and how they are, appear, and behave, is fallacious, false, unjust. This vitiates certain prevalent forms of liberalism. One could suppose that these conclusions are discouraging, but encouragement applies to potentiality.